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interject her claim in this action under the terms of section 
387 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That section provides in 
part as follows: "At any time before trial, any person, who 
has an interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success 
of either of the parties, or an interest against both, may 
intervene in the action or proceeding." The import of this 
language has been the subject of frequent comment in num-
erous decisions of the appellate courts of this state .. 
In Elliott v. Superior Oourt, 168 Cal. .727 [145 Pac. 101], 
it was declared at p. 734: "The interest mentioned in the 
code which entitles a person to intervene in a suit between 
other persons must be in the matter in litigation and of such 
a direct and immediate character that the intervener will 
either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect 
of the judgment." In Isaacsv. Jones, 121 Cal. 257[53 Pac. 
793, 1101], it was said at page 261 that the "interest" 
specified in the above-mentioned section of the code "must be 
direct and not consequential, and it must be an interest which 
is proper to be determined in the action in which the inter-
vention is sought." To the same effect were the decisions in 
La Mesa etc. lrr. Dist. v. Hailey, 195 Cal. 739, 741 [235 Pac. 
999] ; Jersey Maid Milk Products 00. v.Brock, 13 Cal. (2d} 
661, 663 [91 P. (2d) 599]; Lindsay-Strathmore lrr. Dist. 
v. Wutchumna Water 00., 111 Cal. App. 707, 710 [296 Pac. 
942]. "And .the code does not attempt to specify what or 
how :great that interest shall be, in order to give a right to 
intervene. Any interest is sufficient. The fact that the inter-
vener mayor may not protect that interest in some other way 
is not material. If he 'has an interest in the matter in litiga-
tion, or in the success of either of the pa:nies,' he has a right 
to int~rvene." (Ooffey v. Greenfield, 55 Cal. 382, 383; Dennis 
v. Kolm, 131 Cal. 91, 93 [63 Pac. 141].) Accordingly, it 
has been uniformly held in this state that a third party whose 
property ,has. been levied upon in an action against another 
has such an interest in the subject matter as entitles him to 
intervene for the purpose of establishing his right and re-
moving the cloud cast on his property by the attachment. 
(~ennis v. Kolm, supraj Bonfiglio v. Bonfiglio, 203 Cal. 409 
[264 Pac. 747] ; Berghauser v. Golden State Orchards, 208 
Cal. 1550 [28~ Pac. 950].) 
[1] Applic;mtion oLthese principles to the present case 
compels the conclusion that the intervener did not possess 
an interest legally . sufficient to .sustain her intervention in 
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the suit which was instituted against her husband for the 
purpose of adjudicating his liability as the accommodation 
maker upon the promissory note. The wife would neither 
gain nor lose by the direct legal operation and effect of a 
money judgment rendered against her husband, the defendant 
Axelrod. Admittedly, the community property which she 
sought to protect by intervening in this action had not been 
endangered by an actual seizure or in any' other manner. • . 
. No seizure of the community property has as yet even been 
threatened. Granting that it was the plaintiff's intention in 
the event of his recovery, to attempt to satisfy his judgment 
from the community property, it is entirely conceivable that 
the defendant Axelrod might'decide to discharge the indebted-
ness by payment from his separate funds or thatthep1aintiff 
might not in fact initiate proceedings to enforce collection. 
. From these observations it is manifest that the intervener's 
interest in the instant action was remote and contingent ani 
was not· of the direct and immediate character required by 
law to support her intervention. (Elliott v. Superior Oourt, 
supra.) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
.' . Gibson, C. J~, Shenk, J" Carter, J., .~d Traynor, oJ., con-
curred. 
[S. ]'. No. 16056. Tn Bank. May 27, 1942;J 
;FRITZ WEST·PHAL et aI., 'Appellants, v; THEODORE 
. WESTPHAL et aL, Respondents. 
[1] Judgments-Equitable Relief-Fraud-Extrinsic Fraud: Mis-
. ... i ' take;~The final judgment of . a court having jurisdiction over 
persons' and subject matter can be attacked in eqnity after 
expiration of the time for direct attack only if the alleged 
,fraud or .mistake is extrinsic .. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Judgments, §§ 251 (2), 253; [2] 
Judgments, § 251 (3), 253; [3, 5] Decedents'. Ectates, § 1078; [4] 
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[2] Id.-Equitable Relief-Fraud-What is Extrinsic Fraud: Mis-
take.-Fraud or mistake is extrinsic so as to authorize equi-
table relief against, a judgment when it deprives the unsuc-
'cessful party of an oppor~unity to present his case to the 
court, as where he has been kept in ignorance of the action 
or has been prevented from fully participating therein. But 
any fraud perpetrated on a party is intrinsic and not ground 
for such equitable relief where he has been given proper 
notice of an action, where he has not been prevented from 
full participation therein, and where he has had an oppor-
tunity to present his case and protect himself from the fraud. 
[3a., 3b] Dece4ents', Esta~es-Final Distribution-Equitable Relief 
-Pleading.-Prob, Code, § 1242, requiring the judgment roll 
in probate proceedings to include proof of service, is in-
applicable to a decree of distribution rendered prior to its 
enactment: And in an action for equitable relief from such 
a decree in which the complaint does not allege that the 
plaintiffs did riot receive proper notice of the proceedings, 
it 'must be presumed that they received such notice in ac-
cordance ,with the statutory requirements effective at the time. 
[4] Judgments-Equitable Relief-Presumptions-Notice.-In an 
action for equitable relief from a final judgment of a court of 
general jurisdiction, it will be presumed in support of the 
judgment' that proper notice was given to the parties in the 
absence of an affirmative showing to the contrary, 
[6] Decedents' Estates-Final Distribution-Equitable Relief-
Pleading-Concealment.-In an action for equitable relief 
from a decree of distribution, an allegation that the defen-
dants concealed from the court the existence of plaintiffs, 
contingent remaindermen, and their contingent remainder in 
a portion of the estate is not an allegation that they did 
not receive notice' of the proceedings. It is at best an alle-
gation of the failure to make proof of such, notice, and such 
failure would not deprive the court of jurisdiction' or prevent 
the plaintiffs from presenting their case and thus constitute 
extrinsic fraud or mistake warranting equitable relief. 
APPEAL from a. judgment of the Superior Court of Ala-
meda County. Frank M.Ogden, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action to establish an involuntary trust, for an accounting, 
and to compel the execution of a conveyance to the plaintiffs 
[3] See I1A Cal. Jur. 184. 
[5] See 15 Cal. Jur. 68. 
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Judgment following the sustaining' of a demurrer to the com~ 
plaint as to certain of the plaintiffs,affirmed. ,; " ' 
:Frank'D; Parker, James H. Boyer, Treadwell & Laughlin 
and Ru~sell E. BarneS for Appellants. 
, ' 
Donahue, Richards & Hamlin for Respondent& 
TRAYNOR, J.-John C. Westphal died testate March 9, 
1912, leaving five sons surviving him, Theodore, William, 
George, Fred"and JohnC. Jr. Under his will Theodore, 
William and George were each to receive an undivided one~ 
fifth of his estate. The remaining two-fifths was given to 
Theodore and George in trust to pay the income therefrom 
to Fred and John C.Jr. for life. 
The will provided that "In the event of the death of my 
said son, John C. Westphal, Jr., after my death, I direct that 
one-half (lh) of said fund and property so held: in trust, as 
aforesaid, (the income of which is directed to be paid as afore-
said) immediately vest in, and I hereby give, devise and 
bequeath to the widow and children of said John C.Westphal, 
Jr., share and share alike, a vested remainder in fee in and 
4" to one-half (lh) of said property so devised in trust, as afore-
said, and, if he leaves no wife surviving him,then said one-
half (lh) of said trust property shall vest in, and I hereby 
give, devise and bequeath to the children of said John C. 
Westphal, Jr., by right of representation, a vested remainder 
in fee in and to one-half (%) of said property so devised in 
trust as aforesaid. In the event that'said John C. Westphal, 
, Jr., should die leaving no wife surviving him and leaving no 
children and having no children of a deceased child or 
children, then I direct that said one-half (%) of ,the said 
trust property shall immediately lest in Theodore Westphal, 
William Westphal, and George Westphal, named hereinabove, 
share and share alike, and to their heirs respectively, and, 
in that event, I do hereby give, devise and bequeath to said 
Theodore Westphal, William Westphal and George Westphal, 
share and'share alike, and to their heirs, respectively, a vested 
remainder in fee in and to said one-half (lh) of said property 
so devised in trust, as aforesaid, to take effect in possession 
immediately upon the termination of said trust, as provided, 
in paragraph four of this will." A similar provision gov-
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t4at if~I).y child contested the will, he should take ,nothing, 
and the share given to him in trust or otherwise should go 
to the testator's other children. 
In March, 1912, the will wias admitted. to • probate., In 
March,1913, John C. Westphal, Jr., andFred Westphal filed 
a petition to revoke the probate of the will, and on June 18th 
of that year dismissed their petition. On June 24, 1913, 
Theodore and William Westphal filed, as executors of the 
estate, a verified petition requesting final distribution of the 
estate to themselves and to George Westphal on the ground 
!hat John C. Westphal, Jr., and Fred Westphal, having con-
tested the wIn, forfeited their interests in the estate. On July 
28, 1913, the probate court entered its· order fo~ a 9.ecree of 
distributi9n in accordance with the petition, but made no 
reference to the interest of the widow and children of John 
C. Westphal, Jr. 
On January 25, 1935, John C. Westphal" Jr., died. His 
widow and eleven children brought the present action on 
August 3i, i937, claiming an undivided one-fifth interest in 
the estate of John C. Westphal. The complaint alleges that 
the will contest of March, 1913, was instituted pursuant to a 
con~piracy by aU the sons of the testator to defraud plaintiffs 
of their conditional remainde'r iit the estate, and that. the 
plaintiffs' remainder interest in the estate was concealed from 
the probate court. Theodore,William arid George Westphal, 
who took equal shares of John C. Westphal, Jr.'s undivided 
one-fifth interest under the decree of distribution, are named 
defendants. .Two causes of action are set forth, one based 
upon extrinsic fraud and the other upon extrinsic mistake. 
Plaintiffs ask that defendants be. adjudged involuntary 
trustees,.that an accounting be had, that.plaintiffs be declared 
owners of the property and that defendantS be compelled to . . 
convey the property to them. 
Defendants demurred o:d the grounds. that the decree of 
distribution is not now subject to attack because the alleged 
fraud and mistake were intrinsic and that. the action is 
barred by the statute of limitations as set forth in se~tions 
338(4), 338(3), 318 and 343 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
The trial court overruled the demurrer as to plaintiffs Ray-
mond C. Westphal and Adele B.W estphal, who were unborn 
at the time of the alleged fraud and minors at the· death of 
their father, John C. Westphal, Jr., and sustained the de-
murrer as to the other plaintiffs. The latter have appealed. 
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[1] The final judgment of a court having juri!'ldictioD 
over persons and subject matter can be attacked inequit, 
after the time for appeal or other direct attack has expired 
only if the alleged fraud or mistake is extrinsic rather than 
intrinsic. (United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61 [25 
L. Ed. 93] ; In Re Griffith, 84 Cal. 107 [23 Pac. 528, 24 Pac. 
381] ; Pico v. Oohn, 91 Cal. 129 [25 Pac. 970, 27 Pac. 537, 
25 Am. St. Rep. 159, 13 L. R. A. 336]; Olivera v. Grace, 
19 Cal. (2d) 570 [122 P. (2d) 564].) [2] Fraud or mistake 
is extrinsic when it deprives the unsuccessful party of an 
opportunity to present his case to the court. (Oaldwell v. 
Tayl6r, 218 Cal. 471 [23 P. (2d) 758, 88 A. L. R. 1194]; 
Tracy v. Muir, 151 Cal. 363 [90 Pac. 832," 121 Am. St. Rep. 
117] ; Bacon v~ Bacon, 150 Cal. 477 [89 Pac. 317.] ; Sohler v. 
Sohler; 135 Cal. 323 [67 Pac. 282, 87 Am. St Rep; 98]. See 
23 Cal. L .. Rev. 80; 9 Cal. L. Rev. 156). Han unsuccess-
ful party to an action has been kept in ignorance thereof 
(Purintonv. Dyson, 8 Cal. (2d) 322 [65 P. (2d) 777, 1ia 
A. L. R. 1230] ; Zaremba v. Woods, 17 Cal. App. (2d) 309 
[61 P. (2d) 976]) or has been prevented from fully partici-
pating therein (Oaldwell v. Taylor, supra), there has been 
no true adversary proceeding, and the judgment is' open to 
.. attack at any time. A party who has been given proper notice 
of an action, however, and who has not been prevented from 
full participation therein, has had an opportunity to present 
his case to the court and to protect himself from any fraud 
,attempted by his adversary. (Tracy v. Muir, 151 Cal. 363 
[90 Pac; 832, 121 Am. St. Rep. 117] ; Abels v. Frey, 126 CaL 
App. 48 [14 P. (2d) 594]; Langdonv. Blackburn, 109 CaL 
19 [41 Pac. 814].) Fraud perpetrated under such circum-
stances is intrinsic, even though the unsuccessful party does 
not avail himself of his opportunity to appear before the 
court. Having had· an opportunity to protect his interest, he 
'cannot attack the judgment once the time has elapsed for 
appeal or other direct attack. (Langdon v. Blackburn, 109 
Cal. 19 r 41 Pac. 814] ; Tracy v. Muir, 151 Cal. 363 [90 Pac. 
832, 121 Am. St. Rep. 117] ; see Eichhoff v.' Eickhoff, 107 Cal. 
42, 48 [40 Pac. 24,48 Am. St. Rep. 110].) 
[311.] In the present case plaintiffs allege that after the 
simulated will contest by Fred Westphal and John C. West-
phal,Jr., the defendants obtained a decree of'distribution 
that awarded them the entire estate py concealing from the 
~ L , 
--. 
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probate court the existence of the plaintiffs and the latter's 
contingent remainder in a portion of the estate. Tpere is no 
allegation, however, that plaintiffs did not· receive, proper 
notice of the probate proceedirtgs and the petition for the 
decree of distribution, or thl1t plaintiffs were in any way 
prevented from appearing in the proceedings and calling the 
attention of the court to their interest in the estate. [4] 1:t 
will be presumed in support of a final judgment of a court 
of general jurisdiction in California that prope~ . notice . was 
given to the parties in the absence of an affirmative showing 
to the contrary. (Estate of Twom:bfey, 120 Cal. 350, 351 [52 
Pac. 815] ; Daly v. Pennie, 86 Cal. 552 [25 Pac. 67, 21 Am. 
St. Rep. 61] ; Miller v. Pitman, 180 Cal. 540 [182 Pac. 50] ; 
Abels v. Frey, 126 Cal. App. 48 [14 P. (2d) 594.) ; Langdon 
v. Blackburn, supraj Estate of Chapman, 158 Cal. 740 [112 
Pac. 302] ; In Re Griffith, 84 Cal. 107 [23 Pac. 528, 24 Pac. 
381] ; Tracy v. Muir, 151 Cal. 363 [90 Pac. 832, i21 Am. St. 
Rep. 117].) [3b] The application of this presumption to 
the decree of distribution under attack in the present case is 
not affected by Probate Code section 1242, requiring that ~he 
jUdgment roll in probate proceedings include proof of service 
upon the parties concerned (Cf. F. H. Dam, The New Judg-
ment Roll in Probate, 8 State Bar Journal 234; see 11A Cal. 
Jur., § 116), because this decree was rendered long before the 
enactment of that section. In the absence of an allegation that 
plaintiffs did not receive proper notice of the proceedings it 
must be presumed that they received such notice in accordance 
with the statutory requirements effective at that time. [5] 
The allegation that defendants concealed from the probate 
court the existence of plaintiffs and the latter's contingent 
remainder in a portion of the estate is not an allegation that 
plaintiffs did not receive notice but is at best an allegation 
that proof of such notice was not made to the court. So long 
!'is plaintiffs received notice, however, a failure to make proof 
of such notice would not deprive the court of jurisdiction 
or prevent the plaintiffs from presenting their case. (Herman 
v. Santee, 103 Cal. 519 [37 Pac. 509, 42 Am. St. Rep. 145], 
overruling Reinhart v. Lugo, 86 Cal. 395 [24 Pac. 1089], 
see, also, Estate of Eikerenkotter, 126 Cal. 54 [58 Pac. 370], 
and 15 Cal. Jur. 68, § 150.) 
Under the presumption of service plaintiffs had notice of 
the proceedings, and there was nothing to prevent their 
participating therein. They therefore had an opportunity to 
present their case and direct the attention of the court to 
, 
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theIr interest in the estate. It follows that there is no ex-
trinsic fraud or mistake alleged in the present case that is 
sufficient to constitute the basis for an attack inequity upon 
the decree of distribution. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Carter, J., con-
curred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied June 25, 
1942. 
\ 
[Crim. No. 4402. In Bank. May 28, 1942.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. JOHN LA WRENCE 
COLEMAN, Appellant. 
[1] Jury - Qualifications of Jurors-Sex. - In a prosecution for 
wife murder, no prejudice to the defendant may be inferred 
because the trial jury consisted of ten women and two men 
and one woman alternate. 
[2a, 2b] Homicide-Evidence-Sufficiency-Intent.-In.a prosecu-
tion for wife murder, the verdict of guilty without recommen-
dation of life imprisonment was. supported by evidence show-
ing the defendant's procurement of a gun and cartridges, a 
trip by him to the town in which his wife had a business es-
tablishment, the drinking of much liquor en route, and the 
shooting. Even if the jury believed the defendant's testimony 
that as the result of the drinking he had no recollection of 
events after leaving an intermediate station in the course of 
his journey,' there was sufficient evidence to justify the im-
plied finding of the formation of a specific intent before the 
commencement of the trip, and .the continuance thereof to con-
trol his act. 
[3a, 3b] Criminal Law-Evidence-Sufficiency - Insanity. - In a 
prosecution for murder, although there was testimony ·that the 
defendant, an inebriate, had successive attacks of delirium 
tremens prior to the murder charged, and despite treatments 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Jury, § 36; [2] Homicide, §§ 145 (3), 
158; [3] Criminal Law, § 584; [4] Criminal Law, § 403 j [5] Crim-
inal Law, § 1331; [6] Criminal Law, § 766. 
